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Abstract 
 
Inequality and gender economic exclusion are major policy concerns facing sub-Saharan 
Africa in the post-2015 development agenda. The study provides critical masses of inequality 
that should not be exceeded if governance is to promote gender economic participation. The 
research focuses on 42 countries in sub-Saharan Africa using annual data spanning from 2004 
to 2014. The empirical evidence is based on the Generalized Method of Moments. The 
following findings are established. First, inequality (i.e. the Gini coefficient) levels that 
completely nullify the positive effect of governance on female labour force participation are 
0.708 for political stability, 0.601 for voice & accountability, 0.588 for government 
effectiveness, 0.631 for regulatory quality, 0.612 for the rule of law, and 0.550 for corruption-
control. Second, inequality thresholds at which female unemployment can no longer be 
mitigated by governance channels include: 0.561 (for political stability) and 0.465 (for the 
rule of law). Third, inequality levels that completely dampen the positive impact of 
governance on female employment are 0.608 for political stability, 0.580 for voice & 
accountability, 0.581 for government effectiveness, and 0.557 for the rule of law. As the main 
policy implication, for good governance to promote gender economic inclusion, inequality 
levels should not exceed established thresholds.  
JEL Classification: G20; I10; I32; O40; O55  
Keywords: Africa; Gender; Inequality; Inclusive development 
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1. Introduction  
According to the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), it is exclusively by 
addressing the apparent issue of income inequality in Africa that the continent can achieve 
sustainable poverty reduction and progress significantly towards the attainment of Sustainable 
Development Goals (SDGs) in the post-2015 development agenda (UNDP, 2017).  The 
conclusions of the UNDP are consistent with the contemporary empirical literature. For 
instance, Bicaba, Brixiova and Ncube (2017) have concluded that, it is unlikely for countries 
in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) to achieve the SDG threshold of reducing extreme poverty to 
below 3% unless inequality is addressed:  “This paper examines its feasibility for Sub-
Saharan Africa (SSA), the world’s poorest but growing region. It finds that under plausible 
assumptions extreme poverty will not be eradicated in SSA by 2030, but it can be reduced to 
low levels through high growth and income redistribution towards the poor segments of the 
society” (p. 93).  A significant contribution to the underlying inequality in SSA is the 
exclusion of the female gender from the formal economic sector2 (Efobi, Tanakem & Asongu, 
2018). While good governance is relevant in addressing female economic exclusion, existing 
levels of inequality can affect the effectiveness of such governance measures in the promotion 
of gender participation in the formal economic sector (Fosu, 2008, 2009, 2010a, 2015; 
Asongu & Odhiambo, 2019a)3. Such underpinnings motivate the positioning of this study on 
inequality thresholds that crowd-out the favourable effect of good governance on female 
economic inclusion in SSA. Having clarified the background for this research, it is relevant to 
critically engage and substantiate factors motivating the positioning of   this study, notably: (i) 
the policy and scholarly concerns of inequality and gender exclusion in SSA in the light of the 
SDGs; (ii) the documented relevance of good governance in driving inclusive development 
outcomes and (iii) gaps in contemporary scholarly literature. The factors are substantiated in 
the same chronological order. 
 First, consistent with contemporary African scholarly and policy literature on 
inequality, inequality in SSA is a fundamental setback to sustainable development in the sub-
region (McGeown, 2017; Asongu & Kodila-Tedika, 2017; Tchamyou, 2019a, 2019b; Asongu 
& le Roux, 2019). Within this framework of inequality, the concern of gender exclusion 
                                                          
2
 The terms “gender inclusion”, “gender economic participation”, “female labour force participation”, “female 
employment”, “female economic participation” and “gender economic inclusion” are used interchangeably 
throughout the study 
3
 It is important to note that the conclusions of Fosu are consistent with the position that, government actions in 
the promotion of inclusive development are hampared by existing levels of inequality.  
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underlying this study pertains to at least two SDGs, notably: (i) SDG 5 (i.e. “achieve gender 
equality and empower all women and girls”) and (ii) SDG 8 (i.e. “promote sustained, 
inclusive and sustainable economic growth, full and productive employment and decent work 
for all”). The concern of gender exclusion is particularly relevant to SSA because females in 
the sub-region are the poorest in the world (Hazel, 2010) and both the scholarly and policy 
research on the issue are consistent on the position that women in SSA are mostly involved in 
small trading activities, subsistence agriculture and domestic activities that are largely always 
unpaid (Ellis, Blackden, Cutura, MacCulloch & Seebens, 2007; FAO, 2011; International 
Labour Organisation, 2013; Tandon & Wegerif, 2013;World Bank, 2015;  Efobi et al., 2018).  
 Second, good governance has been established to be an important channel through 
which economic and inclusive developments are enhanced in Africa (Efobi, 2015; Asongu & 
Kodila-Tedika, 2016; Ajide & Raheem, 2016a, 2016b). Moreover, the underlying literature 
broadly accords on the position that appropriate and robust governance initiatives are 
fundamental in the driving of economic prosperity and encouragement of private sector 
development, which entails job opportunities for the female gender in the formal economic 
sector. The governance variables which are defined in the data section logically attest to the 
fact that political, economic and institutional dimensions of governance are relevant in 
providing a favourable economic atmosphere for job creation and entrepreneurship. A recent 
World Bank report which has estimated the loss in income from the exclusion of women in 
the formal economic sector at about 2.5 trillion USD, has also recommended good governance 
in the formulation and implementation of appropriate policies that can curtail the exclusion of 
women in the formal economic sector (World Bank, 2018; Nkurunziza, 2018). The 
recommendations of the World Bank are taken on board in this study given that the 
governance channel is acknowledged and empirically engaged as a mechanism by which the 
participation of women in the formal economic sector can be enhanced, contingent on existing 
inequality levels. Moreover, the positioning of this research in light of the recommendation 
from the World Bank is also partly motivated by a gap in the extant literature.   
 Third,  as far as we have reviewed, the contemporary scholarly literature on gender 
equality in Africa has failed to engage the relevance of good governance in promoting 
economic inclusion with particular emphasis on how income inequality affects the “good 
governance”-“female inclusion” nexus. In the attendant literature, Ntayi, Munene and 
Malinga (2018) provide nexuses between financial access and mobile money with emphasis 
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on moderation from gender and social networks. As argued by Uduji and Okolo-Obasi (2018), 
it is relevant to take women into consideration when implementing technology-driven policies 
designed to boost agricultural productivity in rural areas. Kairiza, Kiprono and Magadzire 
(2017) study the relationship between gender gaps and inclusive finance whereas Elu (2018) 
investigates the relevance of improving girls’ and women’s involvement in science studies. 
The importance of gender within informal and financial sectors is investigated by Bayraktar 
and Fofack (2018) while Mannah-Blankson (2018) focuses on the nexus between gender 
exclusion and financial access within the framework of microfinance. A strand of studies has 
investigated the importance of gender participation in agricultural development that is 
sustainable (Theriault, Smale & Haider, 2017) whereas another strand of research has been 
oriented towards the  importance of information and communication technology (ICT) in 
driving female employment either directly (Efobi et al., 2018) or indirectly by means of the 
financial access channel (Asongu & Odhiambo, 2018a).  
Among the engaged literature, the study closest to this research is Efobi et al. (2018) 
who have concluded that ICT positively affects female employment in the following 
increasing order of magnitude: mobile phone penetration, internet penetration, and fixed 
broadband subscriptions. This study departs from Efobi et al. (2018) from two main 
perspectives. On the one hand, contrary to the use of ICT, inequality and governance are 
employed as the independent variables of interest, in the light of the motivation underpinning 
this research. On the other, the thresholds of inequality that dampen the positive effect of 
good governance on female employment are provided. Furthermore, on the latter departure 
from Efobi et al. (2018), this study argues that it is not enough to provide policy makers with 
findings based on magnitudes of direct effects between macroeconomic variables. In essence, 
in order to provide policy makers with more policy options, actionable policy measures 
should result from the findings. To this end, this research provides critical masses of 
inequality that should not be exceeded if governance is to promote female economic 
participation.  
 This is an applied economics study. Hence, the authors are fully cognizant of the 
issues related to engaging empirics without established theoretical underpinnings. However, 
the authors also posit that applied economics should not exclusively be based on the premise 
of accepting or rejecting existing theoretical underpinnings. Accordingly, conforming to a 
growing branch of the literature, this research is premised on the importance of applied 
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econometrics in theory-building (Costantini & Lupi, 2005; Narayan, Mishra & Narayan, 
2011; Asongu & Nwachukwu, 2016a). According to the attendant literature, applied 
econometrics that proceeds from sound intuition is a useful scientific activity. As 
substantiated throughout this introduction, the intuition underlying this research is simple to 
follow: existing levels of inequality affect the role of governance in promoting gender 
economic participation. Hence, it is relevant to assess maximum levels of inequality at which, 
good governance no longer promotes female economic inclusion.  
 It is worthwhile to further substantiate the intuition for the study by providing 
clarifications to two more tendencies motivating this study, notably: that economic inequality 
can affect governance structures and economic inequality can also affect the participation of 
women in the formal economic sector. Accordingly, the attendant literature is consistent on 
the position that the responsiveness of government-tailored inclusive policies to economic 
prosperity is hampered by existing levels of income inequality. To put this intuition into more 
perspective:   “The study finds that the responsiveness of poverty to income is a decreasing 
function of inequality” (Fosu, 2010b, p. 818); “The responsiveness of poverty to income is a 
decreasing function of inequality, and the inequality elasticity of poverty is actually larger 
than the income elasticity of poverty” (Fosu, 2010c, p. 1432); and “In general, high initial 
levels of inequality limit the effectiveness of growth in reducing poverty while growing 
inequality increases poverty directly for a given level of growth” (Fosu, 2011, p. 11). These 
conclusions from Fosu are relevant in motivating the study because income-driven policies 
from governments are designed to ultimately promote inclusive development. 
 In light of the above, the corresponding research question this study aims to answer is 
the following: what levels or thresholds of inequality completely nullify the positive incidence 
of governance on female economic inclusion? Two hypothetical premises are necessary to 
answer the question, notably: governance should positively affect inclusive economic 
participation while the interaction between governance and inequality should have the 
opposite effect.  
Hypothesis 1: there are positive unconditional effects from the incidence of governance on 
female economic inclusion. 
Hypothesis 2: there are negative conditional effects from the interaction between governance 
and inequality on female economic inclusion.  
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 The underlying hypotheses are partly supported with stylized facts on the nexuses 
between inequality (i.e. the Gini coefficient) and the dynamics of female economic 
participation. Accordingly, as apparent in Figure 1 from the left to the right, while the 
relationship between inequality and female economic participation is not very apparent (i.e. 
first graph): (i) there is a positive nexus between inequality and female unemployment (i.e. 
second graph) and (ii) a negative nexus between inequality and female employment (i.e. third 
graph).   
The rest of the research is organised in the following manner. Section 2 covers the data 
and methodology whilst the empirical findings are presented and discussed in section 3. The 
study concludes in section 4 with implications and future research directions.  
Figure 1: Inequality and Female Economic Participation  
   
 
 
2. Data and methodology 
2.1 Data 
This research focuses on 42 countries in sub-Saharan Africa using annual data spanning from 
2004 to 20144. These scopes of geography and periodicity are motivated by the justifications 
for the research articulated in the introduction as well as data availability constraints at the 
time of the study. The data are obtained from four main sources. First, the inequality indicator 
which is the Gini coefficient is from the Global Consumption and Income Project (GCIP).  
                                                          
4 The 42 countries include: “Angola, Benin, Botswana, Burundi, Cabo Verde, Cameroon, Central African 
Republic, Chad, Comoros, Congo Democratic Republic, Congo Republic, Côte d’Ivoire, Djibouti, Ethiopia, 
Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mauritius, 
Mozambique, Namibia, Niger, Nigeria, Rwanda, Sao Tome & Principe, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, 
South Africa, Sudan, Swaziland, Tanzania, Togo, Uganda and Zambia”.  
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 Second, borrowing from Efobi et al. (2018) which is partly motivating this research, 
three gender economic inclusion indicators from the International Labor Organisation are 
used, namely: female labor force participation, female unemployment rate and female 
employment rate5. Third, in line with recent African governance literature (Oluwatobi, Efobi, 
Olurinola, Alege, 2015; Andres, Asongu & Amavilah 2015; Ajide & Raheem, 2016a, 2016b; 
Tchamyou, 2017; Asongu, le Roux, Nwachukwu & Pyke, 2019), six governance indicators 
are sourced from World Governance Indicators of the World Bank, namely:  (i) political 
stability, “voice & accountability” (components of political governance), (ii) regulatory 
quality, government effectiveness (constituents of economic governance), (iii) corruption-
control and the rule of law (components  of institutional governance). Accordingly: “The first 
concept is about the process by which those in authority are selected and replaced (Political 
Governance): voice and accountability and political stability. The second has to do with the 
capacity of government to formulate and implement policies, and to deliver services 
(Economic Governance): regulatory quality and government effectiveness. The last, but by no 
means least, regards the respect for citizens and the state of institutions that govern the 
interactions among them (Institutional Governance): rule of law and control of corruption” 
(Andres et al., 2015, p. 1041). 
 Fourth, two main control variables are adopted from the World Development 
Indicators of the World Bank, namely: mobile phone penetration and remittances. These 
indicators are motivated by contemporary African inclusive development literature (Efobi et 
al., 2018; Asongu & Nwachukwu, 2018; Asongu & Odhiambo, 2018b; Tchamou et al., 2019).   
The expected signs are contingent on country-specific effects that are not considered in the 
estimation exercise because the adopted GMM approach is designed such that country-
specific effects are eliminated in order to prevent the concern of endogeneity which results 
from the correlation between the lagged outcome variable and country-specific effects. 
However, in accordance with the attendant empirical literature, mobile phone penetration is 
expected to increase female labour force participation and female employment while it is also 
anticipated to decrease female unemployment. Concerning remittances, Meniago and Asongu 
(2018) have recently established that they increase inequality in Africa because majority of 
the population moving abroad from the continent are from rich households. Consequently, 
                                                          
5
 While the gender economic inclusion indicators are obtained from a credible source such as the International 
Labour Organisation, the claim that three indicators of gender economic inclusion are used may also be doubtful. 
For example, the measurement of female unemployment rate can simply be the opposite of female employment 
rate (i.e. 100 minus female employment rate).   
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when funds are remitted to Africa, these funds end-up improving the financial standing of rich 
households, ceteris paribus. The narrative on inequality has been confirmed within the 
framework of female exclusion by Asongu and Odhiambo (2018a). 
 Concerns may arise as to why variables in the conditioning information set are limited 
to two. It is worthwhile to note that, such restriction of elements in the conditioning 
information set in order to avoid concerns of instrument proliferation is not uncommon in the 
empirical literature, in so far as the motivation for such restriction is to obtain valid models 
and robust coefficients. Cases in GMM-centric literature that are relevant in substantiating 
this perspective include: (i) Bruno, De Bonis and Silvestrini (2012) who have used two 
control variables as in this study and (ii) Osabuohien and Efobi (2013) and Asongu and 
Nwachukwu (2017) who have not used any control variable. The definitions and sources of 
variables are provided in Appendix 1 whereas the summary statistics is disclosed in Appendix 
2. The correlation matrix is covered in Appendix 3. 
 
 
2.2 Methodology 
2.2.1 GMM Specification 
Borrowing from recent GMM-centric literature, the GMM empirical approach is adopted for 
this study because of four main fundamental factors (Meniago & Asongu, 2018; Tchamyou, 
2019a, 2019b; Tchamyou et al., 2019; Agoba, Abor, Osei, & Sa-Aadu, 2019; Fosu & Abass, 
2019). (i) In this research, the number of sampled countries (i.e. N) far exceeds the number of 
periods in each cross section (i.e. T). Hence, the N>T condition warranted for the employment 
of the strategy is met. (ii) Persistence is exhibited by the outcome variables of female 
economic inclusion because the correlations between first lag and level series’ are higher than 
0.800 which is the rule of thumb threshold for confirming persistence in a variable (Asongu & 
Odhiambo, 2019b, 2019c). (iii) The panel data strucure of the research informs the study that 
cross-country differences are taken on board in the estimations. (iv) The concern of 
endogeneity is also addressed by the study because, on the one hand, reverse causality or 
simultaneity is tackled with the use of internal instruments and on the other; the unobserved 
heterogeneity is controlled by means of time-invariant omitted indicators.   
            The GMM approach adopted in this study is the Roodman (2009a, 2009b) strategy 
which has been documented to limit the proliferation of instruments. The following equations 
in level (1) and first difference (2) summarise the standard system GMM estimation 
procedure.  
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where, tiFE , is an indicator of gender economic inclusion (i.e. female labour force 
participation, female unemployment rate and female employment rate) of  country i
 
in  
period t , 0  is a constant, G  entails governance (political stability, “voice & accountability”, 
regulatory quality, government effectiveness, rule of law and corruption-control), I denotes 
the income inequality indicator or the Gini coefficient,  GI reflects interactions between 
governance  and inequality indicators (“political stability” × “the Gini coefficient”; “voice & 
accountability” × “the Gini coefficient”; “regulatory quality”×“the Gini 
coefficient”;“government effectiveness” × “the Gini coefficient”; “the rule of law”×“the Gini 
coefficient” and “corruption-control”× “the Gini coefficient”), M is mobile phone 
penetration, R is remittances,  represents the coefficient of auto-regression which is one 
within the framework of this study because a year lag appropriately captures past information, 
t is the time-specific constant, i is the country-specific effect and ti ,  the error term.  
 
2.2.2 Identification and exclusion restrictions 
 
          For a robust GMM specification, it is relevant to articulate the identification strategy as 
well as the exclusion restrictions that underpin the identification approach. This research is in 
accordance with contemporary GMM-centric literature in considering years as strictly 
exogenous and the independent variables (i.e. governance channels, inequality policy 
syndrome and control indicators) are predetermined or endogenous explaining (Asongu & 
Nwachukwu, 2016c; Tchamyou & Asongu, 2017;  Boateng et al., 2018; Tchamyou et al., 
2019). Roodman (2009b) also argues in favour of this strategy by maintaining that years 
cannot become endogenous in a difference series6.   
In light of the explanation above, the identification and exclusion restrictions are assessed on 
the basis of the Difference in Hansen Test (DHT) for instrument exogeneity.  The alternative 
hypothesis of this test is the position that the instruments are not exogenous whereas the 
corresponding null hypothesis is the stance that such instruments exhibit strict exogeneity. 
Therefore, in the findings that are reported in the empirical section, for this exclusion 
restriction assumption to hold, the null hypothesis of the DHT should not be rejected. The 
                                                          
6Hence, the procedure for treating ivstyle (years) is ‘iv (years, eq(diff))’ whereas the gmmstyle is employed for predetermined variables. 
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clarifications on identification and exclusion restrictions pertaining to validating the adopted 
instruments is not different from the criterion in traditional instrumental variable (IV) 
techniques which require that the null hypothesis of the Sargan/Hansen test should not be 
rejected in order for the instruments to be valid (Beck,Demirgüç-Kunt& Levine, 2003; 
Asongu & Nwachukwu, 2016d). 
 
3. Empirical results  
3.1 Presentation of results  
This section discloses the regressions results in Tables 1-3. Table 1 focuses on the nexus 
between inequality, governance and female labour force participation while Table 2 is 
concerned with linkages between inequality, governance and female unemployment. Table 3 
focuses on connections between inequality, governance and female employment. The use of 
various governance and female economic inclusion variables is also a measure of robustness 
check. Each table is partitioned into three main fractions of governance, consisting of the 
following order: (i) political stability and “voice & accountability” (in the first category of 
political governance); (ii) government effectiveness and regulatory quality (in the second 
category on economic governance) and (iii) the rule of law and corruption-control (in the third 
category for institutional governance).   
              Four information criteria are used to examine the validity of estimated models7. In 
the light of these criteria, specifications in the 3rd and 4th columns of Table 2 are invalid. The 
invalidity is essentially based on the fact that the null hypotheses of the Hansen 
overidentifying restrictions tests are rejected. It is relevant to note that the Hansen test which 
is more robust than the Sargan test is weakened by the proliferation of instruments. This is not 
the case with the Sargan test which is not sensitive to instrument proliferation.  Hence, an 
approach through which the underlying conflict of interest is avoided is to adopt the Hansen 
test and ensure that instrument proliferation is limited. A criterion of limiting instrument 
proliferation is that instruments should be less than the number of cross sections in each 
specification.  
                                                          
7
 “First, the null hypothesis of the second-order Arellano and Bond autocorrelation test (AR (2)) in difference for the absence of 
autocorrelation in the residuals should not be rejected. Second the Sargan and Hansen over-identification restrictions (OIR) tests should not 
be significant because their null hypotheses are the positions that instruments are valid or not correlated with the error terms. In essence, 
while the Sargan OIR test is not robust but not weakened by instruments, the Hansen OIR is robust but weakened by instruments. In order to 
restrict identification or limit the proliferation of instruments, we have ensured that instruments are lower than the number of cross-sections 
in most specifications. Third, the Difference in Hansen Test (DHT) for exogeneity of instruments is also employed to assess the validity of 
results from the Hansen OIR test. Fourth, a Fischer test for the joint validity of estimated coefficients is also provided” (Asongu& De Moor, 
2017, p.200). 
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              This research follows the approach of Asongu (2018) in establishing thresholds of 
inequality that crowd-out the favourable impact of good governance on female economic 
inclusion. For instance in the last column of Table 1, the maximum value of inequality at 
which corruption-control positively affects female labour force participation 0.550 
(2.559/4.646). In this computation, 2.559 is the unconditional effect of corruption-control on 
female labour force participation while 4.646 is the absolute value of the conditional effect 
from the interaction between corruption-control and the Gini coefficient. Hence, above a Gini 
coefficient threshold of 0.550, the Gini coefficient completely crowds-out the positive 
unconditional effect of corruption-control (i.e. 2.556) on female labour force participation. 
                 The following findings can be established from Tables 1-3.  First, inequality levels 
that completely nullify the positive effect of governance on female labour force participation 
are: 0.708 (for political stability); 0.601 (“voice & accountability”); 0.588 (government 
effectiveness); 0.631 (regulatory quality); 0.612 (rule of law) and 0.550 (for corruption-
control). Second, inequality thresholds at which female unemployment can no longer be 
mitigated by governance channels are 0.561 (for political stability) and 0.465 (for the rule of 
law). Third, inequality levels that completely dampen the positive effect of governance on 
female employment are 0.608 (for political stability), 0.580 for voice & accountability, 0.581 
for government effectiveness, and 0.557 for the rule of law. Most of the significant control 
variables display the expected signs.  
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Table 1: Governance, Inequality and Female Labour Force Participation  
       
 Dependent variable: Female Labour Force Participation (FLFP) 
       
 Political Governance Economic  Governance Institutional  Governance 
 Political 
Stability 
Voice & 
Accountability 
Government 
Effectivness 
Regulation 
Quality 
Rule of Law Corruption-
Control 
FLFP (-1) 0.959*** 0.942*** 0.966*** 0.969*** 0.954*** 0.949*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Gini Coefficient (Gini) -0.523 4.658* 1.054 2.025 -2.785 3.158 
 (0.806) (0.085) (0.638) (0.452) (0.560) (0.220) 
Political Stabiility (PolS) 1.486** --- --- --- --- --- 
 (0.042)      
Voice & Accountability(VA) --- 7.818*** --- --- --- --- 
  (0.000)     
Government Effectivenss (GE) --- --- 4.151*** --- --- --- 
   (0.005)    
Regulatory quality (RQ) --- --- --- 4.887** --- --- 
    (0.011)   
Rule of  Law (RL) --- --- --- --- 6.821** --- 
     (0.038)  
Corruption-Control (CC) --- --- --- --- --- 2.559* 
      (0.051) 
Gini × PolS -2.097* --- --- --- --- --- 
 (0.097)      
Gini × VA --- -13.005*** --- --- --- --- 
  (0.000)     
Gini × GE --- --- -7.048*** --- --- --- 
   (0.006)    
Gini × RQ --- --- --- -7.742** --- --- 
    (0.015)   
Gini × RL --- --- --- --- -11.143** --- 
     (0.039)  
Gini × CC --- --- --- --- --- -4.646** 
      (0.037) 
Mobile Phone Penetration  -0.004** -0.007* -0.002 -0.002 -0.006 -0.006 
 (0.029) (0.050) (0.500) (0.511) (0.124) (0.102) 
Remittances  -0.076*** -0.040*** -0.045*** -0.045*** -0.011 -0.040*** 
 (0.000) (0.008) (0.000) (0.000) (0.580) (0.003) 
       
Time Effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
       
Thresholds 0.708 0.601 0.588 0.631 0.612 0.550 
       
AR(1) (0.042) (0.048) (0.056) (0.057) (0.067) (0.036) 
AR(2) (0.343) (0.222) (0.292) (0.319) (0.216) (0.429) 
Sargan OIR (0.000) (0.191) (0.231) (0.015) (0.000) (0.006) 
Hansen OIR (0.419) (0.299) (0.368) (0.588) (0.428) (0.351) 
 
      
DHT for instruments       
(a)Instruments in levels       
H excluding group (0.109) (0.167) (0.158) (0.171) (0.175) (0.120) 
Dif(null, H=exogenous) (0.680 (0.429) (0.536) (0.781) (0.590) (0.568) 
(b) IV (years, eq(diff))       
H excluding group (0.295) (0.410) (0.698) (0.481) (0.364) (0.470) 
Dif(null, H=exogenous) (0.504) (0.263) (0.206) (0.561) (0.451) (0.288) 
       
Fisher  245055*** 66215*** 3246.97*** 61249*** 1931.54*** 1626.71*** 
Instruments  32 32 32 32 32 32 
Countries  39 39 39 39 39 39 
Observations  366 366 366 366 366 366 
       
***,**,*: significance levels at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. DHT: Difference in Hansen Test for Exogeneity of Instruments Subsets. Dif: 
Difference. OIR: Over-identifying Restrictions Test. The significance of bold values is twofold. 1) The significance of estimated coefficients 
and the Wald statistics. 2) The failure to reject the null hypotheses of: a) no autocorrelation in the AR(1) & AR(2) tests; and b) the validity of 
the instruments in the Sargan and Hansen OIR tests. The mean value of the Gini coefficient is 0.586. na: not applicable because at least one 
estimated coefficient needed for the computation of the net effects is not significant. Constants are included in all regressions. 
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Table 2: Governance, Inequality and Female Unemployment  
       
 Dependent variable: Female Unemployment (FU) 
       
 Political Governance Economic  Governance Institutional  Governance 
 Political 
Stability 
Voice & 
Accountability 
Government 
Effectivness 
Regulation 
Quality 
Rule of Law Corruption-
Control 
FU (-1) 0.910*** 0.918*** 0.884*** 0.906*** 0.841*** 0.949*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Gini Coefficient (Gini) 7.943*** 8.021*** 4.849** 6.596*** 9.648*** 3.158 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.037) (0.000) (0.001) (0.220) 
Political Stabiility (PolS) -2.798** --- --- --- --- --- 
 (0.024)      
Voice & Accountability(VA) --- -5.841*** --- --- --- --- 
  (0.000)     
Government Effectivenss (GE) --- --- -1.215 --- --- --- 
   (0.465)    
Regulatory quality (RQ) --- --- --- -1.677 --- --- 
    (0.212)   
Rule of  Law (RL) --- --- --- --- -6.075** --- 
     (0.011)  
Corruption-Control (CC) --- --- --- --- --- 2.559* 
      (0.051) 
Gini × PolS 4.987** --- --- --- --- --- 
 (0.028)      
Gini × VA --- 10.121*** --- --- --- --- 
  (0.000)     
Gini × GE --- --- 2.876 --- --- --- 
   (0.346)    
Gini × RQ --- --- --- 3.065 --- --- 
    (0.197)   
Gini × RL --- --- --- --- 13.061*** --- 
     (0.002)  
Gini × CC --- --- --- --- --- -4.646** 
      (0.037) 
Mobile Phone Penetration  -0.0002 0.002** 0.003 0.003** -0.003 -0.006 
 (0.938) (0.039) (0.170) (0.017) (0.429) (0.102) 
Remittances  0.083*** 0.010 0.017* 0.0002 0.027 -0.040*** 
 (0.000) (0.209) (0.091) (0.965) (0.190) (0.003) 
       
Time Effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
       
Thresholds 0.561 0.577 na na 0.465 0.550 
       
AR(1) (0.202)  (0.196) (0.198) (0.198) (0.201) (0.036) 
AR(2) (0.378) (0.365) (0.382) (0.385) (0.351) (0.429) 
Sargan OIR (0.000) (0.057) (0.019) (0.001) (0.000) (0.006) 
Hansen OIR (0.698) (0.032) (0.069) (0.109) (0.416) (0.351) 
       
DHT for instruments       
(a)Instruments in levels       
H excluding group (0.264) (0.292) (0.279) (0.417) (0.422) (0.120) 
Dif(null, H=exogenous) (0.810) (0.029) (0.067) (0.084) (0.390) (0.568) 
(b) IV (years, eq(diff))       
H excluding group (0.333) (0.032) (0.328) (0.228) (0.536) (0.470) 
Dif(null, H=exogenous) (0.825) (0.164) (0.053) (0.128) (0.322) (0.288) 
       
Fisher  19656.61*** 15366.52*** 5546.38*** 61088*** 2526.32*** 1626.71*** 
Instruments  32 32 32 32 32 32 
Countries  37 37 37 37 37 37 
Observations  346 346 346 346 346 346 
       
***,**,*: significance levels at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. DHT: Difference in Hansen Test for Exogeneity of Instruments Subsets. Dif: 
Difference. OIR: Over-identifying Restrictions Test. The significance of bold values is twofold. 1) The significance of estimated coefficients 
and the Wald statistics. 2) The failure to reject the null hypotheses of: a) no autocorrelation in the AR(1) & AR(2) tests; and b) the validity of 
the instruments in the Sargan and Hansen OIR tests.The mean value of the Gini coefficient is 0.586.na: not applicable because at least one 
estimated coefficient needed for the computation of the net effects is not significant.Constants are included in all regressions.  
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Table 3: Governance, Inequality and Female Employment  
       
 Dependent variable: Female Eemployment (FE) 
       
 Political Governance Economic  Governance Institutional  Governance 
 Political 
Stability 
Voice & 
Accountability 
Government 
Effectivness 
Regulation 
Quality 
Rule of Law Corruption-
Control 
FE (-1) 0.976*** 0.953*** 0.963*** 0.988*** 0.954*** 0.971*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Gini Coefficient (Gini) -3.651*** -1.717 -2.445 -3.474*** -5.964*** -3.773* 
 (0.001) (0.429) (0.135) (0.000) (0.000) (0.082) 
Political Stabiility (PolS) 2.034** --- --- --- --- --- 
 (0.035)      
Voice & Accountability(VA) --- 6.750*** --- --- --- --- 
  (0.000)     
Government Effectivenss (GE) --- --- 3.725** --- --- --- 
   (0.041)    
Regulatory quality (RQ) --- --- --- 1.561 --- --- 
    (0.221)   
Rule of  Law (RL) --- --- --- --- 6.107*** --- 
     (0.000)  
Corruption-Control (CC) --- --- --- --- --- 2.552 
      (0.193) 
Gini × PolS -3.341* --- --- --- --- --- 
 (0.055)      
Gini × VA --- -11.637*** --- --- --- --- 
  (0.003)     
Gini × GE --- --- -6.411** --- --- --- 
   (0.052)    
Gini × RQ --- --- --- -1.938 --- --- 
    (0.376)   
Gini × RL --- --- --- --- -10.952*** --- 
     (0.001)  
Gini × CC --- --- --- --- --- -4.050 
      (0.288) 
Mobile Phone Penetration  -0.0005 -0.007** -0.004 -0.002 -0.002 -0.007* 
 (0.834) (0.030) (0.155) (0.261) (0.268) (0.056) 
Remittances  -0.049*** -0.015 -0.010 -0.014** 0.0009 -0.012 
 (0.000) (0.112) (0.192) (0.011) (0.884) (0.214) 
       
Time Effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
       
Thresholds 0.608 0.580 0.581 na 0.557 na 
       
AR(1) (0.140) (0.152) (0.145) (0.143) (0.141) (0.148) 
AR(2) (0.276) (0.309) (0.304) (0.289) (0.249) (0.300) 
Sargan OIR (0.006) (0.242) (0.087) (0.007) (0.000) (0.000) 
Hansen OIR (0.757) (0.784) (0.858) (0.875) (0.321) (0.726) 
       
DHT for instruments       
(a)Instruments in levels       
H excluding group (0.178) (0.396) (0.189) (0.434) (0.340) (0.109) 
Dif(null, H=exogenous) (0.923) (0.821) (0.976) (0.902) (0.326) (0.955) 
(b) IV (years, eq(diff)) (0.288) (0.412) (0.622) (0.403) (0.405) (0.451) 
H excluding group (0.919) (0.863) (0.830) (0.957) (0.290) (0.764) 
Dif(null, H=exogenous)       
       
Fisher  440766*** 370965*** 2379.24*** 794776*** 119202*** 2472.08*** 
Instruments  32 32 32 32 32 32 
Countries  37 37 37 37 37 37 
Observations  346 346 346 346 346 346 
       
***,**,*: significance levels at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. DHT: Difference in Hansen Test for Exogeneity of Instruments Subsets. Dif: 
Difference. OIR: Over-identifying Restrictions Test. The significance of bold values is twofold. 1) The significance of estimated coefficients 
and the Wald statistics. 2) The failure to reject the null hypotheses of: a) no autocorrelation in the AR(1) & AR(2) tests; and b) the validity of 
the instruments in the Sargan and Hansen OIR tests.The mean value of the Gini coefficient is 0.586. na: not applicable because at least one 
estimated coefficient neededfor the computation of the net effects is not significant. Constants are included in all regressions. 
 
 
3.2 Further discussion of results  
 The research question motivating this study has centred on the assessment of  the 
levels of income inequality that reduce the effectiveness of governance in tailoring conducive 
policies that ultimately promote the participation of more women in the formal economic 
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sector. In order to make this assessment, two main hypotheses have been tested. The empirical 
findings have largely validated the tested hypotheses because: (i) governance standards 
unconditionally increase female participation in the labour force and female employment (i.e. 
in Table 1 and Table 3) and also unconditionally decrease female unemployment (i.e. Table 
2). The positive unconditional effect of governance validates Hypothesis 1. (ii) As for 
Hypothesis 2, it is apparent that income inequality interacts with governance to reduce female 
participation in the labour force and female employment (i.e. in Table 1 and Table 3) and also 
increase female unemployment (i.e. Table 2). This negative conditional effect thus validates 
Hypothesis 2.  
 The validation of the tested hypotheses is broadly consistent with the literature 
supporting the perspective that government-led actions that are designed to boost economic 
development in view of increasing inclusive development can be attenuated by the existing 
level of income inequality (Fosu, 2008, 2009, 2010a, 2015; Tchamyou, 2019c;  Asongu & 
Kodila-Tedika, 2018) are some studies broadly supporting the validated hypotheses. The 
corresponding policy implications are discussed in the concluding section.   
 
4. Concluding implications and future research directions  
 
The study assesses critical thresholds of inequality at which good governance is no longer 
relevant in promoting gender economic inclusion. The scope of the study consists of 42 
countries in sub-Saharan Africa with data for the period 2004-2014.  Three gender economic 
indicators are used, namely: female labour force economic participation, female 
unemployment and female employment. Inequality is proxied with the Gini coefficient while 
the six governance indicators used are: (i) political governance (consisting of political 
stability and “voice & accountability); (ii) economic governance (entailing government 
effectiveness and regulatory quality) and institutional governance (encompassing corruption-
control and the rule of law). The empirical evidence is based on Generalised Method of 
Moments (GMM).  
The following findings are established.  First, inequality levels that completely nullify 
the positive effect of governance on female labour force participation are: 0.708 (for political 
stability); 0.601 (“voice & accountability”); 0.588 (government effectiveness); 0.631 
(regulatory quality); 0.612 (rule of law) and 0.550 (for corruption-control). Second, inequality 
thresholds at which female unemployment can no longer be mitigated by governance channels 
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are 0.561 (for political stability) and 0.465 (for the rule of law). Third, inequality levels that 
completely dampen the positive impact of governance on female employment are: 0.608 (for 
political stability); 0.580 (“voice & accountability”); 0.581(government effectiveness) and 
0.557 (rule of law). As a main policy implication, in order for good governance to continue 
promoting female economic inclusion, inequality levels should not exceed established 
thresholds.  
It is important for policy makers to, therefore, limit inequality because such reduction 
will not only boost the participation of women in the formal economic sector but will also 
enhance the negative response of extreme poverty to economic growth in the post-2015 
sustainable development agenda in SSA. This inference is consistent with the premise of this 
research – which is that the effectiveness of governance in promoting inclusive development 
is hampered by existing levels of income inequality. It is relevant to recall that about half of 
countries in the sub-region failed to attain the MDG extreme poverty target in spite of the sub-
region having experienced more than two decades of growth resurgence. Hence, reduction of 
income inequality will not exclusively contribute towards the achievement of the SDGs 
motivating this study, notably: (i) SDG 5 (i.e. “achieve gender equality and empower all 
women and girls”) and (ii) SDG 8 (i.e. “promote sustained, inclusive and sustainable 
economic growth, full and productive employment and decent work for all”). Moreover, 
policies designed to promote gender economic participation also have externalities in the 
structural distribution of labour, reduction of poverty and improvement in the general welfare. 
In a nutshell, these will go a long way to addressing most poverty- and inequality-related 
SDGs in the sub-region.   
 Future studies can improve the extant literature by assessing the established findings 
within country-specific frameworks in order to provide room for more targeted policy 
implications. It is also worthwhile to clarify that the GMM approach used in this study is 
designed to eliminate country-specific effects in order to avoid a correlation between the 
lagged dependent variable and such country-specific effects which is a cause of endogeneity.  
Another caveat is that the Gini coefficient which, is used to measure income inequality 
because of its wide usage in the literature, has the shortcoming of not capturing tails or 
extreme points of the inequality distribution. Hence, it would be worthwhile for future studies 
to take on board measures of inequality that are sensitive to outliers of inequality, inter alia: 
the Atkinson index and the Palma ratio. Within this framework, alternative estimation 
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techniques that are designed to capture outliers of outcome variables such as quantile 
regressions are also recommended. Given that the robustness of these alternative techniques is 
not constrained by instrument proliferation like in the GMM estimation technique, other key 
variables such as output or output components and real wage rate should be included in the 
conditioning information set. 
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Appendices 
Appendix 1: Definitions of Variables 
Variables  Signs Definitions of variables  (Measurements) Sources 
    
 
 
Female Economic 
Participation   
FLFP Labor force participation rate, female (% of female 
population ages 15+) (modeled ILO estimate) 
ILO 
   
FU Unemployment, female (% of female labor force) 
(modeled ILO estimate) 
ILO 
   
FE Employment to population ratio, 15+, female (%) 
(modeled ILO estimate) 
ILO 
    
Political Stability  PolS “Political stability/no violence (estimate): measured as 
the perceptions of the likelihood that the government 
will be destabilised or overthrown by unconstitutional 
and violent means, including domestic violence and 
terrorism” 
WGI 
    
 
Voice & 
Accountability  
 
VA 
“Voice and accountability (estimate): measures the 
extent to which a country’s citizens are able to 
participate in selecting their government and to enjoy 
freedom of expression, freedom of association and a 
free media” 
 
WGI 
    
 
Government 
Effectiveness  
 
 
GE 
“Government effectiveness (estimate): measures the 
quality of public services, the quality and degree of 
independence from political pressures of the civil 
service, the quality of policy formulation and 
implementation, and the credibility of governments’ 
commitments to such policies”. 
 
 
WGI 
    
 
Regulatory quality 
 
RQ 
“Regulatory quality (estimate): measured as the ability 
of the government to formulate and implement sound 
policies and regulations that permit and promote 
private sector development”. 
 
WGI 
  
 
 
 
Corruption-Control 
 
 
CC 
“Control of corruption (estimate): captures perceptions 
of the extent to which public power is exercised for 
private gain, including both petty and grand forms of 
corruption, as well as ‘capture’ of the state by elites 
and private interests” 
 
WGI 
    
 
 
Rule of Law  
 
 
RL 
“Rule of law (estimate): captures perceptions of the 
extent to which agents have confidence in and abide by 
the rules of society and in particular the quality of 
contract enforcement, property rights, the police, the 
courts, as well as the likelihood of crime and violence” 
 
 
 
WGI 
    
Gini Coefficient  Gini  “The Gini coefficient is a measurement of the income 
distribution of a country's residents”. 
GCIP 
    
Mobile Phones  Mobile  Mobile cellular subscriptions (per 100 people) WDI 
    
Remittances Remit Remittance inflows to GDP (%) WDI 
    
WDI: World Bank Development Indicators of the World Bank. FDSD: Financial Development and Structure 
Database of the World Bank. WGI: World Governance Indicators of the World. ILO: International Labour 
Organisation. GCIP: Global Consumption and Income Project.  
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Appendix 2: Summary statistics (2004-2014) 
      
 Mean SD Minimum Maximum Observations 
      
Female Labor Force participation  130.03 83.996 1.000 287.00 462 
Female Unemployment, female 58.273 44.334 1.000 152.00 462 
Female Employment  113.19 69.850 1.000 256.00 462 
Political Stability  -0.490 0.867 -2.687 1.182 528 
Voice & Accountability -0.509 0.683 -1.780 0.970 462 
Government Effectiveness -0.711 0.599 -1.867 1.035 462 
Regulatory quality -0.608 0.529 -1.879 1.123 462 
Corruption-Control -0.577 0.590 -1.513 1.139 462 
Rule of Law -0.651 0.604 -1.816 1.007 462 
Gini Coefficient  0.586 0.034 0.488 0.851 461 
Mobile Phone Penetration  45.330 37.282 0.209 171.375 558 
Remittances  4.313 6.817 0.00003 50.818 416 
      
S.D: Standard Deviation.   
 
 
 
 
Appendix 3: Correlation matrix (uniform sample size: 378) 
             
FLFP  FU FE PolS VA GE RQ CC RL Gini Mobile Remit  
1.000 -0.281 0.946 0.079 -0.120 -0.005 -0.004 -0.040 -0.038 -0.039 -0.224 -0.185 FLFP 
 1.000 -0.568 0.311 0.260 0.366 0.306 0.399 0.369 0.376 0.237 0.270 FU 
  1.000 -0.043 -0.206 -0.118 -0.101 -0.163 -0.151 -0.148 -0.267 -0.255 FE 
   1.000 0.724 0.656 0.674 0.736 0.778 0.335 0.293 0.070 PolS 
    1.000 0.721 0.741 0.712 0.797 0.241 0.375 0.058 VA 
     1.000 0.915 0.840 0.902 0.308 0.423 -0.124 GE 
      1.000 0.781 0.879 0.323 0.508 -0.159 RQ 
       1.000 0.892 0.342 0.381 0.092 CC 
        1.000 0.270 0.424 0.008 RL 
         1.000 0.145 0.055 Gini 
          1.000 -0.032 Mobile 
           1.000 Remit 
             
FLFP: Female Labour Force participation. FU: Female Unemployment. FE: Female Employment. PolS: Political Stability. VA: Voice & 
Accountability. GE: Government Effectiveness. RQ: Regulatory quality. CC: Corruption-Control. RL: Rule of Law. Gini: Gini Coefficient. 
Mobile: Mobile Phone Penetration. Remit: Remittances.  
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